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WELCOME AND GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION
Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
International trade
International monetary system
Multinationals
Development
International organizations
...
ISSUE AREAS
  
Part I: Theoretical perspectives and a historical 
background
Liberalism, realism, Marxism.
Global capitalism in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.
From Bretton Woods to globalization.
OUTLINE OF THE COURSE
  
Part II: Political economy of international trade
International trade regime.
Bretton Woods institutions:
World Trade Organization (WTO).
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
World Bank.
Political economy and trade theories.
Free trade versus protectionism.
OUTLINE OF THE COURSE
  
Part III: The North-South divide and economic 
development
Trade and development.
Development strategies.
Import substituting industrialization (ISI).
Export oriented industrialization (EOI).
Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus.
Crises and the Post-Washington Consensus.
Emerging economies and the Beijing Consensus.
OUTLINE OF THE COURSE
  
Part IV: Globalization and regionalization
Controversies about globalization.
The role of multinational corporations.
Social and environmental dumping.
Regional blocs: EU, NAFTA, UNASUR, ASEAN.
Capital flows: FDI and portfolio.
Financialization and financial crisis.
Ongoing debates in IPE.
OUTLINE OF THE COURSE
  
There will be a final exam, a mid-term exam, and 2 
presentations and assignments whose weights in your 
course grade are listed below.
- Final exam (January): 55%
- Mid-term (October-November): 20%
- Presentation, Assignments, Class Participation: 25%
GRADING
  
The exam will be organized as following:
- First Question: Choose between two questions of 15 
points each. Each question is divided into different 
subsections
- Second Question: Choose between two questions of 10 
points each. Each question is divided into different 
subsections
- Third Question: briefly explain the meaning and the 
relevance for IPE of some words or concepts you will be 
given.
FINAL EXAM
  
- Read in advance the references indicated for each class.
- You are expected to be an active participant in this 
course.
- Take advantage of the classes in order to ask questions 
and solve difficulties.
- Get used to read on a daily basis as many sources of 
information as possible, including journals, newspapers 
and web sites.
- Keep up-to-date with the course web.
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
  
The exam will be on the whole program, no matter if 
something is underlined, played down or even left apart by 
the teacher. Make sure you exactly know the syllabus and 
the readings.
Develop a consistent and precise argument while 
answering:
- Go directly to the point.
- Pertinent connections among different topics will be 
appreciated.
- Proper use of English is essential.
The structure of the exam may be subjected to changes 
throughout the course.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXAMS
  
Textbook:
OATLEY, Thomas (2014). International Political Economy. 
Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy (5th 
edition. Pearson Longman.
Other suggested readings:
FRIEDEN, Jeffrey (2007). Global Capitalism, Its Fall and 
Rise in the Twentieth Century. W.W. Norton and Company.
LECHNER, Frank J. and BOLI, John (eds.) (2008). The 
Globalization Reader. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.
BASIC BIBLIOGRAPHY
  
Mario del Rosal (lecturer): mariodel@ucm.es
TEACHING STAFF
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y PART I:
Theoretical perspectives and a historical background
Week 1:
INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE
Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
REQUIRED READINGS:
- Oatley, 1
  
POLITICAL ECONOMY
ECONOMICSECONOMY
POLITICSECONOMY
SUBJECT AND TERMINOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
LOSERS
WINNERS
  
International trade system
International monetary system
Multinational corporations (MNCs)
Economic development
IPE ISSUE AREAS
  
HOW? WHY?
How does politics shape the decisions that societies make 
about how to use the resources that are available to them?
Explanatory studies (positive)
WELFARE AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES?
What are the consequences of these political and economic 
decisions?
 Evaluative studies (normative)
QUESTIONS
  
Traditional 
IPE schools
Liberalism
Realism
(Mercantilism, Nationalism)
Marxism
TRADITIONAL IPE SCHOOLS
  
REALISM (MERCANTILISM, NATIONALISM)
–17th - 18th centuries.
–Empirical use: Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Louis XIV).
–Economic strength is a critical component of national 
power.
–Trade is to be valued for export, but governments should 
discourage imports whenever possible.
–Some forms of economic activity are more valuable than 
others (industry above all).
  
LIBERALISM
–18th - 19th centuries.
–Adam Smith, David Ricardo. Robert Thomas Malthus.
–The purpose of economic activity is to enrich individuals, 
not to enhance the state’s power.
–Countries gain from trade regardless of whether the 
balance of trade is positive or negative (comparative 
advantages theory).
–Industry is not more important than any other activity. 
Countries get wealthier by trading with products they 
produce at a relatively low cost in exchange of other they 
produce at a relatively high cost.
  
MARXISM
–19th century.
–Karl Marx.
–Deep critique of capitalism.
–Labour theory of value  surplus value  exploitation  → surplus value → exploitation → → surplus value → exploitation → → surplus value → exploitation → 
class struggle.
–Competition + Capital concentration and centralisation 
 mechanisation  Tendency of the rate of profit to fall.→ surplus value → exploitation → → surplus value → exploitation → 
–Income gap between wages and needs of realization   → surplus value → exploitation → 
underconsumption.
  
  
Societal 
interests
Material interests
(Utilitarianism)
Ideas
(Orthodoxy)
Political 
institutions
INTERESTS, IDEAS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Labour
States
Capital
Other groups
Economic 
policies
Rules
Elites
Democracy
Law
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y PART I:
Theoretical perspectives and a historical background
Week 2:
APPLYING THEORETICAL TOOLS 
IN REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA
Preparatory class:
THE GOLD STANDARD
Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
“The international monetary system is the glue that binds 
national economies together. Its role is to lend order and 
stability to foreign exchange markets, to encourage the 
elimination of balance of payments problems, and to 
provide access to international credits in the event of 
disruptive shocks.”
Eichengreen, Barry (1996). Globalizing Capital.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: DEFINITION
  
“Nations find it difficult to efficiently exploit the gains 
from trade and foreign lending in the absence of an 
adequately functioning international monetary mechanism 
[…] it is impossible to understand the operation of 
international economy without also understanding its 
monetary system.”
Eichengreen, Barry (1996). Globalizing Capital.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: WHY?
  
“Many readers will imagine that an international monetary 
system is a set of arrangements negotiated by officials and experts 
at a summit conference [….].
In fact, monetary arrangements established by international 
negotiations are the exception, not the rule. More commonly, 
such arrangements have arisen spontaneously out of individual 
choices of countries constrained by the prior decisions of their 
neighbors and, more generally, by the inheritance of history.”
Eichengreen, Barry (1996). Globalizing Capital.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: HOW?
  
Under bimetallism, the value of any currency is defined as 
equivalent both to a certain quantity of gold and to a certain 
quantity of silver. This system establishes a fixed rate of 
exchange between the two metals.
Therefore:
- Both gold and silver money are legal tender in unlimited 
amounts.
- The government will convert both gold and silver into legal 
tender coins at a fixed rate for individuals in unlimited 
quantities.
Traditional fixed exchange rate silver to gold: 15 to 1.
BIMETALLISM
  
Lifespan: 1800  1820 (UK)  1870 (US and Europe).→ 1820 (UK) → 1870 (US and Europe). → 1820 (UK) → 1870 (US and Europe).
- UK: 16th century  1717 (Newton’s error)  1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
(restrictions)  1819.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- US: 1792 (15 to 1)  1834 (16 to 1)  [1862: fiat money → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
“greenbacks”]  1879.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- France: 1803 (15.5 to 1 by law)  1873.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Latin Monetary Union (Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Greece): 
1865  1878.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
BIMETALLISM
  
Advantages:
- Price stability.
- Gold as reserve value; silver for low value transactions.
Theoretical and historical problems (1850-1873):
- Changing relative value of metals.
- Gresham’s Law: contradiction between official fixed rate 
and market relative values.
- Gold Rush in mid-1850s (California, Canada, Australia…).
- Silver discoveries in 1870s.
BIMETALLISM
  
BIMETALLISM
  
Under the gold standard, the value of any currency is defined 
as equivalent to a certain quantity of gold at a fixed rate.
- Central Banks are committed to change national currency 
at this fixed rate  high and sound gold reserves required.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Gold just as reserve value and exchange ratio.
- Pound as world currency, London as financial centre and 
liquidity provider.
GOLD STANDARD
  
Lifespan: 1820 (UK)  1870  [WW1]  1930s.→ 1820 (UK) → 1870 (US and Europe). → 1820 (UK) → 1870 (US and Europe). → 1820 (UK) → 1870 (US and Europe).
- UK: 1819 (Resumption Act)  1844 (full GS)  1914. → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
Again 1925-1931.
- Germany: 1872  1914. → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Sweden: 1873  1914. Again 1922-1931.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- US: 1879  1900 (Gold Standard Act)  1914. Again 1919 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
 1933. Again 1934 (35$/ounce)  Bretton Woods.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- A signal of a country’s economic reliability.
GOLD STANDARD
  
Advantages (  Pax Britannica):→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Long-term prices stability (but short-term unpredictability).
- Stable exchange rates  less uncertainty in international trade → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
and freer capital movements. More important for finance.
- Automatic gold rushes in case of deflation (1880-90s: Alaska, 
South Africa, Australia...).
- Price–specie flow mechanism. David Hume (18th century)   → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
Quantitative Theory of Money.
+ X/M  gold inflow  + prices (including wages)  external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external 
competitive loss, + D domestic, – D foreign → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external  – X/M 
– X/M   gold outflow  – prices (including wages)  external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external 
competitive gain, – D domestic, + D foreign  → gold inflow → + prices (including wages) → external + X/M ...
GOLD STANDARD
  
Disadvantages:
- Central Bank continuous interventions to maintain the value 
of national currency  drop in gold reserves.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Insufficient money supply’s growth to suit economic growth 
needs  deflation and stagnation.→ 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
- Deflation harms debtors and benefits lenders  growing → 1717 (Newton’s error) → 1774 
inequality and social unrest.
- Too tightening to face economic recessions, impossibility of 
expanding monetary policy (1873-1896 crisis worsening).
- Gold standard needs social peace (i.e. no strikes against wage 
deflation), free capital movements and no state intervention.
GOLD STANDARD, CROSS OF GOLD
  
Monetary Trilemma: impossibility of having at the same time:
1. monetary sovereignty
2. capital mobility
3. fixed exchange rates.
Since the gold standard implies the last two features, Central 
Banks lost monetary policy as a tool to solve economic recessions.
The same nowadays within the EMU?
GOLD STANDARD
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y PART I:
Theoretical perspectives and a historical background
Week 2:
APPLYING THEORETICAL TOOLS 
IN REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA
Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
REQUIRED READINGS:
—Lairson and Skidmore, 3.
Recommended readings:
—Frieden, 1-4.
  
HEGEMONY OVER THE CENTURIES
Hegemons:
16th century: Spain, Portugal.
17th-18th centuries: France, Netherlands.
19th century: United Kingdom.
20th century: United States.
21st century: China?
  
–Natural resources (domestic and colonial): wool, 
cotton, slaves, coal, hydropower, rivers, sea coast.
–Agricultural revolution. Increasing productivity  → 
growing profits, decreasing labour force, commodification.
–Property changes: openfields, commonfields  Enclosure → 
Acts. Expropriation of small farmers, large estates.
–Technical improvements: crop rotation (Norfolk), fertilizers, 
seed drill (Jethro Tull), mechanical reaper (McCormick).
–Proletarianisation, urbanization, demographic 
transition. Causes: improvements in agriculture, hygiene 
and medicine; rural expropriation.
–Consequences: expanding domestic market, labour force 
surplus, rural flight, urbanization and suburbanization.
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND COMMERCIAL 
CAPITALISM. WHY UK?
  
–Early commodification and monetarisation of the 
economy. Few restrictions to movements, plenty of capital.
–Commercial imperialism. Cheap raw materials and 
labour force. Cotton exports. India companies, huge profits.
–Political and military power. UK and Germany victory in 
Seven Years’ War (1756-63)  British hegemony in America → 
and India, Prussian growing power in Europe.
–Epochal innovations and technical achievements. 
Finance, money, accountability, transport, agriculture… 
Entrepreneurship, capitalist mindset, religion? Protection 
against technological spread
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND COMMERCIAL 
CAPITALISM. WHY UK?
  
–First Industrial Revolution:
–Steam power.
–Hand-made production  machinery, factory system.→ 
–Coal and iron.
–Water power.
–Chemical manufacturing.
–Textiles (cotton, wool).
–Economic instability: pronounced upswings and downturns.
–International trade growth faster than production.
1750-1850: FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
  
Monetary system:
–UK: gold standard in practice since 18th, formally since 1819.
–Continental Europe and US: bimetallism.
Commercial system: UK free trade, continental protectionism
–British-led transition from mercantilism to liberalism: economic 
gains for all, growing importance of manufactures and increase 
of interdependence.
–UK commercial hegemony (wool  cotton).→ 
–Napoleonic wars and British blockade (1806-1814)  continental → 
protectionism until 1850s (infant industries)  continental and → 
US development, UK exports stagnation.
1750-1850: FROM FREE TRADE TO PROTECTIONISM, 
VARIOUS MONETARY SYSTEMS
  
European catch-up:
–UK’s decline in agriculture and industry. Technology spread.
–France backwardness: neither coal nor iron, protectionism.
–Germany’s continental leadership: cheap and skilled labour 
force, coal and iron, powerful bourgeoisie, militarism, 
Zollverein (1834), unification (1871).
–Belgium rapid development: coal, railways, active bourgeoisie.
Golden Age:
–Railroads as the main destination for investment.
–Great expansion: 1848-1873. Remarkable downturns and 
financial crisis: 1847, 57, 67.
–Stock companies, concentration and centralization of capital
1850-1870: CONTINENTAL CATCH-UP, GOLDEN AGE
  
Monetary system:
–Serious problems of bimetallism 1850-1870 (changing relative 
values, Gresham’s law...).
–Failed projects of monetary union (Latin Union, 1865).
–British hegemony  pound sterling as world currency.→ 
Commercial system: towards free trade with reservations
–Free trade promoted by UK (Corn Laws, Navigation Acts, 
Cobden-Chevalier Treaty). Wars against protectionism in 
colonies and foreign markets (Opium Wars, 1840-42).
–Expanding international division of labour and trade.
1850-1870: BRITISH-LED FREE TRADE, FAILED 
BIMETALLISM, POUND AS WORLD CURRENCY
  
British initiative towards free trade
Protectionism: artificially 
high prices in agriculture Eden Treaty (1786)
Free trade: lower costs for 
industry and city, reduction 
of tariffs in Europe
Bigger markets for industry 
specialization and economies 
of scale
Corn Laws abolition 
(1846)
Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty (1860)
Navigation Acts 
abolition (1849)
...
Declining agriculture, rising 
industry  power shift→ 
  
“Economic theories prevail […] only when they 
have mobilized political authority, that is, only if 
those who believe the theories get the resources 
That enable them to take authoritative action.”
Peter Gourevitch
BRITISH INITIATIVE TOWARDS FREE TRADE
  
–Second Industrial Revolution: from coal to oil. New 
industries: electricity, automotive, oil, chemicals, steel, 
transports, communications, food, building. Taylorism/Fordism, 
mass production (Model T: 1908). Larger firms.
–Long Depression: 1873-1896. UK and France decline, Germany, 
US and Japan rise. Remarkable upswing: 1896-1914.
–UK: economic growth based on trade and imperialism, 
productivity relative decline. Foreign investment.
–US: economic and demographic take-off, huge domestic market, 
plenty of raw materials, labour force deficit (high wages).
–Germany and Japan: state support, concentration (Konzern, 
zaibatsu), skilled labour force.
–Biggest labour force migration in history (Europe  US, Aus).→ 
–Financial capitalism: great expansion of capital movements.
1870-1914: SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
  
1870-1914: US AND GERMANY RISE, UK DECLINE
Distribution of world industrial production (%)
  
Monetary system:
–Gold standard: 1870-1914. Fixed exchange rate gold-currencies 
and states intervention to keep it.
–Pound as world currency (gold as reserve value and exchange 
ratio), London as financial centre and liquidity provider.
Commercial system: the golden age of globalization
–Free trade-led specialization. More interdependence, but no 
supranational agreements or organizations. Great expansion of 
trade and capital movements. Also trade wars and retaliations.
–Imperialist globalization of production and trade: raw materials 
and monoculture from colonies and periphery, manufactures 
from metropolis and core. Foreign control of tariffs and barriers.
–UK free trade along with continental and US protectionism 
(infant industries, domestic markets, state revenues).
1870-1914: IMPERIALISM, GLOBALIZATION, 
INTERDEPENDENCE, GOLD STANDARD, TRADE WARS
  
Causes:
–Political weakness of states to manage domestic and 
international economy.
–German Weltpolitik, tensions in the Balkans...
–US reluctance to assume world political leadership.
–Gold standard limits and contradictions.
WORLD WAR 1 (1914-1918)
  
Consequences:
–15-18 million deaths, 20 million wounded. Economic 
destruction: US GDP x12.
–US hegemony: main supplier of goods and credit during the war, 
first creditor nation afterwards, 42% world production in 1926.
–No government intervention to avoid crisis; austerity.
–Debt and reparations and US insistence on full repayment. Allies 
debts to UK ($11 billion) and to US ($7.2 billion). Germany’s 
unpayable reparations ($438 billion 2016). Neither trade 
surplus, nor capital from abroad. French occupation of the Ruhr 
(1923-25). Plans: Dawes (1924), Young (1929)  US loans to → 
Germany in order to ease payments to France and UK. Eventual 
suspension (Lausanne Conference, 1932). 
–Suspension of gold standard, hyperinflation (Germany 1921-24).
WORLD WAR 1 (1914-1918)
  
Monetary system:
–From gold standard to fiat money, legal tender and competitive 
devaluations: pound: -25% 1931; dollar: -41% 1933).
–Genoa Conference (1922): failed gold exchange system (₤, $). UK 
failed return to gold standard until 1931.
–Huge spread of dollars to Europe by credits and trade until 1928.
Commercial system: beggar-thy-neighbour
–US soft protectionism in the 20s  hard in Great Depression → 
(Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 1930)  retaliations from Europe.→ 
–Colonial trade blocs (UK: Imperial Preference System; France; 
Germany: Central Europe; Japan: invasion of Manchuria...)
–Huge trade balance problems in Europe (no exports to US, no 
current account surplus, no debt payments).
1919-1929: FROM THE ROARING TWENTIES TO THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION
  
–Crash of 1929. Stock Exchange index collapse (100: 1926  225: → 
1929 34: 1932).→ 
–Prolonged and compounded by Central Banks-driven tightening 
of monetary policy due to gold standard’s requirements. 
–US: unemployment (25%, 1932), wages (-50%, 1929-1933), GDP 
(-30%, 1929-1933), financial destruction (- 4.300 bank failures).
–Europe: unemployment (3.5 1925  15 m 1932).→ 
–Germany: unemployment (43%, 1932), GDP (-25%, 1929-1932).
–International trade collapse, massive loan defaults, bank failures, 
falling prices, frozen investments, declining profits.
–Protectionism, competitive devaluations in liberal democracies.
–Economic autarky. Corporatist planning and military expansion 
in fascist regimes.
–Definitive end of gold standard (UK: 1931).
THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1929-1939)
  
PART I:
Theoretical perspectives and a historical background
Week 3:
POST-WAR IPE: 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND 
MULTILATERALISM
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Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
REQUIRED READINGS:
—Lairson and Skidmore, 4.
Recommended readings:
—Marshall Plan Speech.
—Conference at Bretton Woods.
—Frieden, 5-7.
  
–50-80 million deaths, 30 million refugees.
–Economic destruction: 50% European industrial 
production, total cost 7 times WW1.
–US hegemony increased. US GDP x2, Germany, Japan, 
France: GDP/2.
–Massive US war supplies to Europe (Lend-Lease, 1941-45): 
$50 billion.
–Active government intervention in economy to avoid post-
war crisis.
WORLD WAR 2 (1939-1945): ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
  
–Faster growth rates than any other period in the history of 
capitalism. Gradually declining.
–Fuelled by European reconstruction, credit expansion, US 
hegemony and US military Keynesianism.
–Accelerated expansion of international trade, faster than 
production.
–Declining tariffs and expanding openness (US-led, GATT, EEC).
–Convertible currencies and stable monetary system.
–US hegemony, Europe and Japan rapid recovery, “Third World” 
far behind.
–Growing international capital flows and investment: FDI, MNCs.
–Increasing oil dependence, steady and cheap oil prices via US 
military and diplomatic dominion.
FROM WORLD WAR 2 TO THE 70S CRISIS: GROWTH 
PATTERNS
  
–US: economic, military and cultural hegemony. After WW2: 40% 
world GDP, 80% gold reserves; 40% international trade, highest 
productivity (Germany x 2, Japan x 5). Declining growth and 
double deficit from the 60s. Military Keynesianism on Cold War.
–Marshall Plan: $13 billion ($130 billion 2016) 1948-1952 to 16 
countries. 20% loans, 80% aids. For the recovery of Europe and 
the enshrinement of dollar as world currency. Counterpart: 
defence against Communism, cooperation-integration (UE), 
austerity, US supplies.
–Japan: skilled and disciplined labour force (no Unions), steady 
wages, hight productivity, strong saving rates and investment, 
concentration (keiretsu).
–Germany: US investment, domestic savings, social peace, 
moderate wages, skilled and disciplined labour force, high 
productivity, political stability (Social Democracy-
Conservatives), growing trade surplus.
CORE COUNTRIES AND US HEGEMONY
  
CAPITALIST INSTITUTIONS UNDER US HEGEMONY
Bretton 
Woods, 1944
IMF, 1944: to manage exchange rates 
and imbalances, to ease capital flows
 IBRD (WB), 1944: to supplement 
private investment for development
GATT (WTO), 1947: to reduce tariffs 
and other barriers to international trade
NATO, 1949: 
Western military 
defence against 
USSR.
OEEC, 1948 
(OECD, 1961): 
management of 
Marshall Plan.
EEC, 1957 (EC, 
1993; EU, 2009): 
European economic 
integration.
  
Key elements: dollar as world currency.
–Lifespan: 1944/58 – 1971-76.
–Fixed rate gold-dollar $35/ounce + fixed rates foreign 
currencies-dollar.
–US government committed to back every eurodollar with gold.
–Central Banks pledge to intervene to keep exchange rates.
–IMF conditioned short-term loans to solve imbalances: 
public cuts, less money supply, lower wages  recession, higher → recession, higher 
unemployment,  lower inflation  more competitiveness, +X/→ recession, higher 
M  return to exchange rate balance.→ recession, higher 
Permanent wage adjustment?
GOLD-EXCHANGE STANDARD, USD AS WORLD CURRENCY: 
KEY ELEMENTS
  
Triffin Dilemma:
–Short-term US domestic aims vs. long-term international 
objectives.
–Stable rate dollar-gold + stagnant gold supply vs. global 
liquidity needs.
–Using the dollar as new world currency allowed the US to 
run high external deficits, to reduce the gold/dollar ratio 
by printing new money and to create inflation to reduce 
their commercial debts  “America’s exorbitant privilege”.→ recession, higher 
GOLD-EXCHANGE STANDARD, USD AS WORLD CURRENCY: 
PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS
  
–Growing US trade deficit + Germany and Japan trade 
surpluses  dollar glut. Dollar glut + fixed rate  dollar → recession, higher → recession, higher 
overvalued, DM and JPY undervalued  US declining → recession, higher 
competitiveness.
–Competitive devaluations and monetary crisis: franc, pound.
–Growing Eurocurrency markets and international capital 
flows (FDI, MCNs)  stress on fixed exchange rates.→ recession, higher 
–Failed strategies: Gold pool (1961, 67, 68), SDRs, USD 
devaluations (1971, 73).
–Eventual abolition: Nixon shock (1971) Smithsonian 
agreements (1973)  Jamaica accords (1976).→ recession, higher 
GOLD-EXCHANGE STANDARD, USD AS WORLD CURRENCY: 
PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS
  
–Changes in Western dominion over Middle East: UK 
withdrawal (1968-1971).
–Changes in oil production (from US to Middle East) and 
consumption (increasing industrial dependence). D>S.
–End of US, UK and Netherlands MCNs control (“The 
seven sisters”, 40s - 70s) to OPEC (1960).
–1973: prices x4. Yom Kippur war  OPEC embargo.→ recession, higher 
–1979: prices x3. Iran Revolution, Iran-Irak war. 
OIL CRISIS
  
CAPITALISM CRISIS
  
PART II:
Political economy of international trade
Week 4:
BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON GLOBAL 
ECONOMY
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Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
REQUIRED READINGS:
—Oatley, 2.
—Oxfam: “Rigged rules and double standards”
Recommended readings:
—Oxfam: “Running into the sand”.
  
–International trade growth faster than production: $84 
billion, 1953  $18.5 trillion, 2014.→ $18.5 trillion, 2014.
–25%  60% trade to GDP ratio, 1960-2015.→ $18.5 trillion, 2014.
–100 biggest MCNs: 25% world trade.
–1/3 of world trade takes place within companies.
–Top ten traders: 50% international trade.
–Merchandise: 70%; agriculture: 10%; fuels and mining: 20%.
–RTAs growing relevance. World’s exports: UE 33%; NAFTA 
14%; ASEAN 7%.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT
  
MAIN EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS, 2015
  
–General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1948-1995.
–World Trade Organization (WTO), Geneva, 1995.
–2016: 164 members, 634 staff, $193 million budget.
–Director General: Roberto Azevêdo (Brasil).
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO 
elements
Principles and rules
Intergovernmental bargaining
Dispute Settlement Mechanism
  
Principles and rules
Market 
liberalism 
(lesson 5)
Non-
discrimination
Most favoured 
nation (MFN)
National 
treatment
Regional agreements (free 
trade areas, customs unions)
Generalized system 
of preferences (GSP)
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
  
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Intergovernmental bargaining
Rounds + Ministerial 
conferences
8 rounds concluded
Tariffs + Non-tariff 
barriers
Uruguay (1986-1993)
Doha (2001-today, 
breakdown in 2008)
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (lesson 5)
  
DOHA 
BREAKDOWN
Agriculture 
liberalization 
(developing and 
emerging countries)
vs.
“Singapore issues”: 
investment, govt 
procurement, trade 
facilitation, 
competition 
(developed countries: 
US+EU)
  
TARIFFS REDUCTION
Average global tariffs
  
–Double standards: agriculture and labour-intensive 
protectionism vs. manufactures and capital-intensive free trade; 
higher tariffs on impoverished countries; tariff escalation.
–Agriculture subsidies and export dumping (CAP).
–Declining prices of raw materials and agriculture products  → $18.5 trillion, 2014.
worsening terms of trade.
–Forced, harming rapid openness of impoverished countries, 
including privatizations and deregulation (IMF/World Bank 
conditionality and structural adjustment strategies, GATS).
–Restricting intellectual property and patents prevent 
impoverished countries from using new techs, medicines and 
seeds (TRIPS).
–Governments dismantle tax structures and labour right to attract 
FDI; enclaves; subcontracting; gender bias.
–WTO’s democratic deficit (one country, one vote  consensus).→ $18.5 trillion, 2014.
OXFAM CRITICISM AGAINST WTO AND TRADE RULES
  
OXFAM CRITICISM AGAINST WTO AND TRADE RULES
“The advanced 
industrial countries 
still maintain tariffs 
that are four times 
higher against the 
poor countries than 
the tariffs they have 
against other rich 
countries; in fact, 
their whole tariff 
structure is directed 
against trade with 
poor economies.” 
Joseph Stiglitz.
  
OXFAM CRITICISM AGAINST WTO AND TRADE RULES
  
Impoverished 
countries
End of ISI and Communist bloc.
Coordinated bloc (Group of 20).
NGOs and 
civil society
Environmental, health protection
Economic consequences on labour
IMPOVERISHED COUNTRIES, NGOS, CIVIL SOCIETY  → 
COLLAPSE OF DOHA
  
COLLAPSE OF DOHA  REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS→ 
Why RTAs instead of WTO negotiations framework?
–Rapid access to markets after USSR fall and change of 
development strategies from ISI to EOI.
–More secure access to most important trading partners’ 
markets.
–Strong commitment to liberalisation in order to attract 
foreign investment.
–Greater bargaining power than in multilateral trade 
negotiations.
–Trade creation and trade divertion.
–US and EU flight from WTO to RTAs after the increase of 
developing countries power?
  
COLLAPSE OF DOHA  REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS→ 
Main new 
regional 
agreements
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)
TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership)
CETA (Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement)
New objectives:
Investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS), services 
liberalisation, copyright, food safety law, environmental 
protection, banking regulations... 
  
–Current role of the WTO under the new regional 
agreements scenario.
–Criticism against regional trade agreements:
–Labour standards and workers’ rights. 
–Consumer and food protection (transgenic).
–Environmental protection (fracking).
–Privatization of public services.
–Personal privacy.
–Banking regulations.
–States sovereignty.
–Secrecy, undemocratic procedures.
–For the sole benefit of MNCs and investors.
GENERAL CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSION
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Political economy of international trade
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OPERATION OF BRETTON WOODS 
INSTITUTIONS
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l P
ol
iti
ca
l E
co
no
m
y
Mario del Rosal, PhD
mariodel@ucm.es
  
REQUIRED READINGS:
—Oatley, 3.
—Nelson and Weiss, 2015: “IMF Reforms...”.
—Davis, 2006: “Do WTO Rules Create...”.
Recommended readings:
—Miles, 2012: “Argentina Complains to WTO...”.
—Goldstein and Martin, 2000. “Legalization, Trade...”.
—Wroughton, 2012. “IMF Vote Reform Bogged Down...”.
  
International trade:
–Trade offers welfare gains to all countries.
–Protectionism and mercantilist behaviours prevent 
cooperation needed to liberalise trade.
–Institutions are useful to ease this process (WTO, RTAs).
International monetary system:
–Reforms of IMF in order to keep pace with the world 
economy developments.
IN A NUTSHELL
  
Core economic concepts:
–Production Possibility Frontier (PPF), opportunity costs.
–Consumption indifference curves (unnecessary).
–Comparative advantage principle (David Ricardo, 1817): trade 
increase welfare by expanding PPF in all countries.
–Heckscher-Ohlin model: factor endowments.
Simple explanation and conclusion: “Trade raises social welfare 
by enabling consumers to enjoy a higher level of utility than if 
they could consume only goods produced at home. These 
welfare gains do not require a country to have an absolute 
advantage in anything. As long as a country is better at doing 
some things than others, it gains by specializing in what it 
does relatively well and trading for everything else.”
Comprehensive explanation: Krugman: Part I.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE PRINCIPLE
  
Disadvantages of free trade based on this principle:
–Specialization  increasing dependency.→ increasing dependency.
–Decreasing terms of trade (TOT) in commodities.
–Harmful effects on employment (at least, in the short term):
consumer interests > worker interests?
–Harmful effects on infant industries and national firms:
MNCs interests > Local companies?
–Growing transport costs and environmental damages.
–Local habits, culture and products seriously jeopardized by 
MNCs goods and Western cultural imperialism.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE PRINCIPLE
  
TRADE BARGAINING
Economic concepts:
–Spacial theory: status quo position, indifference curves, mutual 
gains zone, contract curve.
–Key elements for bargaining: patient and outside options.
Simple explanation and conclusions: “Although trade 
liberalization raises the standard of living, govts don’t often 
liberalize trade unilaterally. Instead, they strive to open foreign 
markets to the exports of competitive domestic industries and 
continue to protect less competitive industries from imports. As 
a result, trade liberalization generally occurs through trade 
bargaining in which govts exchange market access 
commitments.”
  
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
“The fact that govts cannot be certain that other govts will 
comply with the trade agreements that they conclude.”
–Game theory: prisoners’ dilemma.
–Result  protect/protect: Pareto’s suboptimal and Nash → increasing dependency.
equilibrium.
–No liberalize/liberalize  sucker payoff, no international → increasing dependency.
authority to enforce compliance.
–Conditions for possible cooperation to liberalize and 
comply: iteration, reciprocity (tit-for-tat: retaliation), 
future payoffs.
  
WTO AND THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
WTO advantages for possible cooperation to liberalize and 
comply:
–Stable membership and regular meetings and rounds 
(iteration).
–Transparency (reciprocity).
–Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Dispute Settlement 
Body  consultations  panel of experts  either acceptance → increasing dependency. → increasing dependency. → increasing dependency.
or appeal (up to 15 months)  compliance (and possible → increasing dependency.
compensating retaliation). Example: Brazil – US cotton 
affair.
  
–Bretton Woods, 1945. 2016: 189 members, 2.600 staff.
–Managing Director: Christine Lagarde (France).
–Total resources: 1.2 trillion (roughly Spain’s GDP). Quotas: 
$327 billion. Additional resources: $885 billion. 
–Aims:
–promote international monetary cooperation;
–facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade;
–promote exchange stability;
–assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments; and
–make resources available (with adequate safeguards) to 
members experiencing balance of payments difficulties.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
  
CRITIQUES OF THE IMF
  
IMF REFORM
Main reforms (agreed within the IMF in 2010, approved in the US 
in 2015):
–Size of the fund. Core IMF resources have substantially 
declined as a share of the global economy, while anticipated 
needs have increased. Doubling quota: $330  $660 billion.→ increasing dependency.
–Emerging countries power within the fund. The voice and 
vote of many emerging and developing countries increasingly 
under-represents their current contribution to the global 
economy. 6% shift in quota share to emerging countries. US: 
16.75%  16.5%. BRICS: 11.5%  14.7%. China: 3.8%  6%.→ increasing dependency. → increasing dependency. → increasing dependency.
US: from 31 to 16.5% of voting rights. 85% for substantial 
decisions  US de facto veto power.→ increasing dependency.
Are these the real reasons behind criticisms of IMF strategies? 
Would it be solved with this reform?
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REQUIRED READINGS:
Oatley, 4.
  
TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES MODELS
Factor 
model
Labour vs capital  class struggle→ class struggle
Sector 
model
Importers vs exporters  industry competition→ class struggle
  
FACTOR MODEL
Two countries
China
US
Two goods
Shirts
Computers
Two factors
Labour (L)
Capital (K)
Assumption: mobility of factors in terms of activity and 
location.
  
US
Shirts from CH  – D for US shirts → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
Comp to CH  + D for US comp → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
– – D for L
– D for K
+ D for L
++ D for K
– D for L
+ D for K
– w
+ r
China
Comp from US  – D for CH comp → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
Shirts to US  + D for CH shirts → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
– D for L
– – D for K
++ D for L
+ D for K
– D for K
+ D for L
– r
+ w
  
FACTOR MODEL
Conclusions:
Trade raises the income of abundant factor (K in US, L in 
China) and reduces the income of scarce factor (L in US, K in 
China). So, scarce factors will demand protection whereas 
abundant factors will demand free trade.
If trade continues, tendency to factor prices equalization  → class struggle
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
Weaknesses:
Factor model assumes labour as a homogeneous, but it’s not. 
At least,  we should consider two categories: high-skilled 
workers (in the capital-intensive sector) and low-skilled 
workers (in the labour-intensive sector).
  
SECTOR MODEL
Two countries
China
US
Two goods
Shirts
Computers
Two industries
Apparel
IT
Assumption: immobility of factors in terms of activity 
and location.
  
US
Shirts from CH  – D for US shirts → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
Comp to CH  + D for US comp → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
Apparel industries close
Apparel workers are fired
– r
– w
IT industries grow
IT workers are hired
+ r
+ w
China
Comp from US  – D for CH comp → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
Shirts to US  + D for CH shirts → – D for US shirts → → – D for US shirts →
IT industries close
IT workers are fired
– r
– w
Apparel industries grow
Apparel workers are hired
+ r
+ w
  
SECTOR MODEL
Conclusions:
Trade raises the income of abundant factor-intensive 
industries (IT in US, apparel in China) and reduces the 
income of scarce factor-intensive industries (apparel in US, 
IT in China). So, the latter (import-competing sector) will 
demand protection whereas the former (export-oriented 
sector) will demand free trade.
Weaknesses:
Sector model assumes capital as immobile, but it’s not. At 
least, it’s much easier to be relocated than labour, both for 
economic and social reasons. Therefore, labour and capital 
are not affected neither in the same way nor to the same 
extent by trade.
  
FROM INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS TO POLITICAL ACTION
Transformation of individual interests into political action. 
The collective action problem: free riders.
Consequences in terms of lobbying:
–Producers rather than consumers dominate trade politics.
–Tariffs’ benefits concentrated, tariffs’ costs spread  bias → class struggle
towards protectionism, control by import-competing 
industries.
–Multilateral reciprocal liberalization easier than unilateral  → class struggle
motivates export-oriented industries to lobby (Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act in the US).
  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND TRADE POLICY
Majoritarian
Proportional
High
Low
Sectors
Factors
Electoral 
system
Expected 
protection
Organization 
around...
Just hypothesis, no definite empirical evidence.
  
Weaknesses:
–It explains the conflict between potential winners and 
losers, but not who will eventually win or what trade policy 
outcomes would arise.
–It considers politicians as passive agents with no personal 
interests. Actually, they can shape the configuration of 
interest-groups pressure.
–It does not take into account non-economic interests 
groups (environmental, human rights, gender…).
SOCIETY-CENTERED APPROACH
  
PART II:
Political economy of international trade
Week 7:
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REQUIRED READINGS:
Oatley, 5.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
HISCOX, M. J. (2004). “The Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Economic Policies”, in Ravenhill, J. (ed). Global Political 
Economy. Oxford University Press.
  
STATE-CENTERED APPROACH
Two assumptions:
–Governments can operate independently of interest 
group pressures in pursuit of objectives for the whole 
national economy.
–Under certain circumstances, protectionism –tariffs, 
non-trade barriers (NTBs), subsidies…– can raise 
social welfare.
  
Standard trade model:
Society does best by removing all forms of trade protection 
and by specializing in its comparatively advantaged 
industry. Any protectionist intervention would make society 
worse off by preventing factors from moving out of low-
return into high-return sectors.
Infant-industry model:
Some newly created firms will not be efficient initially but 
could be efficient in the long run if they are given time to 
mature. Temporary tariffs will enable these industries to 
become efficient and begin to export. This long run welfare 
created by the new industry will be greater than the short 
term losses of social welfare imposed by the tariff.
INFANT-INDUSTRY CASE FOR PROTECTION
  
INFANT-INDUSTRY CASE FOR PROTECTION
Reasons for initial inefficiency
Economies of scale Economies of experience
Decreasing unit cost as 
production grows. Fixed costs 
distributed among more units.
Problem: how to reach the 
minimum size to achieve 
economies of scale before 
exporting.
Solution: deliver the 
domestic market to infant 
industries to let them grow.
Efficiency requires specific 
skills that can only be acquired 
through production.
Problem: how to acquire 
those skills before exporting.
Solution: reserve the 
domestic market to infant 
industries to let them learn.
  
Conclusion:
A tariff may encourage factors to move into industries 
which may offer high social returns over the long run, but 
negative short run returns, by raising the short run return 
above what it would be without a tariff.
Criticisms:
–Subsidies better than tariffs: consumers vs state.
–Infant industries should cover short run losses with loans 
from private capital market (alleged efficient markets).
INFANT-INDUSTRY CASE FOR PROTECTION
  
Theoretical development, political implementation:
Alexander Hamilton (US, 18th century), Friedrich List 
(Germany, 19th century).
Developmentalism, structuralist economics (Marxist school), 
related to ISI theory, theory of dependence, world-systems 
theory... (UNCLA, Prebisch, Furtado, A.G.Frank, Dos Santos, 
Marini, Wallerstein, Amin, Arrighi).
Industrial policy, indicative planning.
Late-industrializing countries: Japan, Latin America...
INFANT-INDUSTRY CASE FOR PROTECTION
  
State strength:
The degree to which national policymakers (elected and 
appointed officials) are insulated from domestic interest-
group pressures.
Strong states: highly insulated  centralized authority, → centralized authority, 
effective coordination among state agencies, limited number 
of channels of social influence. Great power to formulate 
long term industrial policies. Japan’s METI-MoF 
administrative guidance; France’s national champions.
Weak states: fully exposed  decentralized authority, lack → centralized authority, 
of coordination among state agencies, large number of 
channels of social influence. Less power to formulate long 
term industrial policies. US’s military industry.
STATE STRENGTH
  
Strategic-trade theory.
–Based on the infant-industry case.
–High-tech: oligopolies and rents (excess returns).
–In some industries, global economic interaction gives rise to 
zero-sum competition over the excess returns available in 
oligopolistic high-tech industries.
–First-mover advantage from economies of scale and 
experience, but government policies can may enable late 
entrants to challenge first movers (subsidies to R&D or 
investment, tariff and NTBs protection, government 
procurement…)
–Semiconductors and commercial aircraft between US, EU 
and Japan as examples.
STRATEGIC-TRADE THEORY
  
Weaknesses:
–Do states act either to enhance national welfare or to 
serve officials personal interests? (microfoundations).
–Can states make policy independent of domestic 
interest-group pressure?
–Strategic-trade theory: too restrictive  assumptions, too 
strong conclusions?
STATE-CENTERED APPROACH
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Oatley, 6.
  
PERIPHERY COUNTRIES TRADE POLICIES
1900s-50s: liberalism.
Exports of agricultural products, imports of manufactures.
1950s-80s: protectionism.
Imports Substitution Industrialization (ISI), structuralism.
1980s-today: liberalism.
WTO, bilateral and regional agreements.
  
FROM LIBERALISM TO PROTECTIONISM
Liberalism: primary structure of production and trade, 
conflict of interests
–Abundantly endowed with land; scarce capital.
–Agriculture, mining, raw: + 50% production and exports. 
Manufactures: - 15% production and exports. Monoexporters.
–Conflict between export-oriented rural landowners and import-
competing urban bourgeoisie:
Before WW2: dominance of landowners (either dictatorships or 
oligarchic democracies in Latin America, colonial enclave 
agriculture in Africa).
After WW2: more power of bourgeoisie and labor (liberal 
democracies). Restrictions for consumer goods exports from 
core countries, lower and more volatile agricultural products.
  
STRUCTURALISM: CRITIQUE OF FREE TRADE
–Industrialization as a basic condition for development.
–Market does not promote industrialization in periphery 
countries.
–Thus, state must intervene by protecting infant industries and 
fostering manufactures.
Partial import-
competing sectors-
led protectionism
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
A
L
IS
M
Comprehensive state-
led development 
strategy
  
STRUCTURALISM: PROBLEMS DUE TO THE MARKET
Problems of coordination due to market contradictions
Complementary 
demand
Pecuniary external 
economies
From pre-capitalist agriculture-
based economy to capitalist 
industry-based economy.
General proletarianization needed 
to create a money market 
economy of consumer goods of 
mass production.
Potential investors will wait until 
others invest  no investment. → no investment. 
Coordination required.
Coordination problem 
between interdependent 
industries. Producers will 
invest only when either their 
suppliers are to increase 
their production or their 
customers are to increase 
their demand.
Solution: state-led big push, 
ei, indicative planing.
  
STRUCTURALISM: PREBISCH-SINGER THESIS
–Terms of trade (TOT) = price of exports/price of imports.
+ TOT  cheaper imports in terms of exports.→ no investment. 
– TOT  more expensive imports in terms of exports.→ no investment. 
–World divided into core (developed) and periphery (developing) 
economies.
–Core exports more manufactures than primary products; 
periphery exports more primary products than manufactures.
–Prices of primary products grow less rapidly than prices of 
manufactures due to differences in income elasticity of demand 
(lower in primary products than in manufactures) and 
differences in the degree of competition (oligopolies in core).
–So, TOT would fall in periphery countries (poorer) and would 
grow in core countries (richer).
  
Structuralism
Dependency theory
World-systems theory
Developmentalism
ISI trade and 
development policy
STRUCTURALISM: THEORIES AND POLICIES
Marxism
  
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION (ISI)
Primary ISI Secondary ISI
Relatively simple consumer 
goods (food, textiles).
Reasons: 1) Large domestic 
demand satisfied with 
imports; 2) Technology and 
machinery easy to be acquired 
from abroad; 3) Low-skilled 
labor required.
Results: 1) Proletarianization; 
2) Higher skills among 
workers and managers.
Consumer durable goods 
(cars), and capital goods 
(machinery).
Backward linkages (supplying 
industries development).
Policy instruments: 1) Govt 
planning; 2) Investment 
policy; 3) Trade barriers. 
Nationalizations.
Two stages of ISI
Export substitution 
strategy (East Asia)
  
COSTS OF THE ISI
Agriculture.
Govt purchased crops to farmers at prices below the world 
price and exported them at the world price  a sort of tax → no investment. 
based on the difference between prices used to finance 
industrialization
Consumers.
Trade barriers and tariffs increased domestic prices of 
manufactures. It affected consumers and, specially, 
farmers.
Industries.
A significant transfer of income from export-oriented 
industries to import-competing industries.
  
REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
SYSTEM
–Colonialism  economic imperialism promoted by GATT rules → no investment. 
(prohibition of any kind of protection).
–United Nation Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 1964  Group of 77. Demands:→ no investment. 
–Commodity price stabilization.
–Financial transfers to compensate for declining TOT.
–Liberalization of core markets for primary products from 
periphery and preference for manufactures.
–Poor results: GATT Part IV, opt out reciprocity, Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP).
–OPEC, commodity power  New International Economic Order → no investment. 
(NIEO): set of proposals rejected by core countries.
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Oatley, 7.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
RODRIK, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: 
Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  
PERIPHERY COUNTRIES TRADE POLICIES
1950s-80s: Structuralism.
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), protectionism.
Skepticism about the market, faith in the state.
1980s-today: Neoliberalism.
Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI), free trade.
Skepticism about the state, faith in the market.
  
Three intertwined factors:
1) Economic imbalances caused by ISI.
2) Rapid East Asian countries development supposedly 
based on neoliberal strategies.
3) 70s and 80s crisis  severe reforms encouraged by → severe reforms encouraged by 
IMF and World Bank.
FROM STRUCTURALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM
  
Persistent budget deficits due to:
– Investments in eventually non-profitable enterprises.
– Subsidies for essential urban services (electricity, water, 
transport, food…).
– Massive public employment.
Persistent current account deficits (M>X) caused by:
– Increasing imports of capital goods and spare parts 
produced in developed countries.
– Decreasing exports of consumer goods due to lack of 
competitiveness of infant industries and weakening 
agriculture (heavy tax burdens).
– Overvalued exchange rates to ease capital goods imports.
ISI IMBALANCES
  
Obstacles:
–Domestic interests (urban classes, industrialists).
– Rent seeking and corruption (for instance, import licences…).
– What reforms: deep into structuralism to enhance it or shift 
to neoliberalism to eliminate it?
Temporary solution?
– Massive foreign loans (fed by petrodollars).
REFORMING ISI?
  
Neoliberal or state-led development strategy?
–From ISI to EOI in the late 50s-early 60s.
– Selective import liberalization (tariffs and NTBs) with two 
complementary aims:
– To protect domestic industries.
– To reduce the cost of imported capital goods.
– Stable macroeconomics:
– Low inflation.
– Convenient exchange rates (via low interest rates).
– Modest fiscal policies, with low budget deficits financed by 
domestic capital instead of foreign loans.
– Huge public investment in education and science.
THE EAST ASIAN MODEL
+ CH
EA
P 
LA
BO
R 
FO
RCE!!!
  
Development stages led by industrial policy: 
1) Low-skilled, labor-intensive light industries (textiles, 
consumer durables...)
2) Heavy capital-intensive industries (steel, shipbuilding, 
petrochemicals…)
3) High skill- and R&D-intensive industries (computers, 
semiconductors, machine tools, robotics, biotech…)
State-controlled capital investment:
Nationalized banks (South Korea) or indicative planned 
investment (Taiwan) in the 60s, 70s and early 80s.
THE EAST ASIAN MODEL
  
Results: 
– High savings rates + High investment rates.
– Low inflation + Sound exchange rates + Increasing 
competitiveness  Early and growing current account → severe reforms encouraged by 
surpluses.
– Dramatic performance gap with Latin America and Africa:
– GDP and GDP per capita.
– Industry output.
– Exports’ growth and change of composition.
THE EAST ASIAN MODEL
  
Periphery countries foreign debt crisis:
– Investment in infrastructures or domestic consumption  no → severe reforms encouraged by 
export revenues needed to repay debts.
– Economic global shocks in the 70s:
– Oil crisis (prices 1973 x4, Yom Kippur war – OPEC embargo; 
prices 1979 x3, Iranian Revolution – Iran-Irak war).
– TOT worsening.
– Increasing interest rates (Fed: 1980-82  15-20%).→ severe reforms encouraged by 
FOREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN THE 80s
  
– IMF-WB financial assistance  → severe reforms encouraged by Structural adjustment: less 
state, more market. The Washington “Consensus”.
–Basic lines:
–Macroeconomic stabilization (inflation, exchange rates).
–Privatizations.
–Trade liberalization (dismantling of tariffs and NTBs).
–Budget tightening  public services cuts, public job losses...→ severe reforms encouraged by 
–Wage reductions, deregulation of labor markets.
– Upon neoliberal (Chicago school) theories, toward East Asian 
allegedly neoliberal model.
– Results: sharp recessions, falling wages, growing profits, 
inequality, income transfer from M-competing to X-oriented.
IMF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
AND THE WASHINGTON “CONSENSUS”
  
FROM THE WASHINGTON “CONSENSUS”
TO THE BEIJING “CONSENSUS”?
Increasing 
questioning of 
the Washington 
“Consensus”
East Asian and China 
economic success
Latin America and Africa 
economic failures
Current long depression
Apparent alternative: the Beijing “Consensus”  state-→ severe reforms encouraged by 
led gradual development strategy (Lesson 10).
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UN MILLENNIUM DECLARATION
– Central challenge: globalization as a positive force.
– Fundamental values:
– Freedom. Free from hunger and violence.
– Equality. Equal rights and opportunities.
– Solidarity. Equity and social justice.
– Tolerance. Diversity of belief, culture and language.
– Respect for nature. Sustainable development.
– Shared responsibility. Multilateralism.
  
UN MILLENNIUM DECLARATION
– Main issues:
– Peace, security and disarmament.
– Development and poverty eradication  → MDGs.
– Protection our common environment.
– Human rights, democracy and good governance.
– Protecting the vulnerable (children and civilians).
– Meeting the special needs of Africa.
– Strengthening the United Nations.
  
UN MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs)
1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty.
2. Achieve universal primary education.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmental sustainability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development.
  
CHINA’S PUZZLING AND SUCCESSFUL REFORM
Achievements 1980s -2000s:
– Average GDP growth rate: 9%.
– GDP per capita x 4.
– Absolute poverty: 250  50 million.→ 
False myths about China development:
– FDI and exports as the driving force. Not just 
coastal growth.
– 1980s agricultural reform as the only successful 
reform and a main key to growth.
  
CHINA’S PUZZLING AND SUCCESSFUL REFORM
Neoliberal recipes 
(Washington Consensus):
– Liberalization.
– Stabilization.
– Privatization.
– Democratization.
China recipes (Beijing 
Consensus):
– Partial liberalization.
– Stabilization.
– No privatization.
– No democratization.
No just best-practice institutions as a desirable goal, but 
feasible paths toward the goal.
  
CHINA’S PUZZLING AND SUCCESSFUL REFORM
4 successful reforms:
1) Dual-track approach to liberalization.
2) Non-conventional ownership: TVEs.
3) Productive fiscal federalism.
4) Government constraints.
1 failure:
– State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
  
1. DUAL-TRACK APPROACH TO LIBERALIZATION
– Between planned and market prices.
– Two tracks (liberalization at the margin):
– Plan track: fixed compulsory quantities and prices.
– Market track: additional quantities can be sold freely in 
the market.
– Deep reforms without losers: allows market profits (new 
winners) and maintains previous rents to compensate 
potential losses (no losers).
– Improves efficiency.
– Eventually transformed into a single market track in the 
late 1990s.
√
  
2. NON-CONVENTIONAL OWNERSHIP: TVEs
– New entry firms as the driving force of growth.
– Most of them local govt firms.
– Main form: Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs).
– Reasons and advantages:
– Weak private property rights.
– Local govts provide public goods useful to central govt.
– TVEs profits  reinvestment or local public goods.→ 
–  Eventually privatized in the late 1990s.
√
  
3. PRODUCTIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM
– Fiscal reform on central-local relations in the 1980s 
(“fiscal contracting system”)  fiscal incentives for local → 
govts to support economic activity and growth:
– Decentralization (local govts allowed to decide over the 
allocation of their expenditures).
– From unified to separated local-central revenues. Central: 
customs, income taxes and SOEs profits. Local: the rest, to 
be shared with central govt and afterwards remitted to 
local govts (almost 100% remission).
– Fiscal reform in 1994 to a federal system closer to Western 
practices.
√
  
4. GOVERNMENT CONSTRAINTS
– Constraints to arbitrary govt behavior as a basic key to 
development. Two ways:
– Rule of law and power balances: not in China.
– Chinese way: reduction of information 
available on incomes and wealth by increasing cash 
transactions, anonymous bank deposits  flat → 
taxation, limits on govt predation, incentive for 
private businesses. Partially offset by benefits from 
state banks.
– Reform in 2000 from anonymous deposits to real-
name banking, an international practice.
√
  
FAILURE: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOEs)
– Privatization of small SOEs in the 1990s.
– Problems to reform large-scaled SOEs. Failed 
attempts:
– Managerial profit incentives (1980s).
– Partial privatizations (1990s): struggles over control 
between managers and Party leaders and “Party control 
personnel”.
X
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Oatley, 8.
Oatley, 9.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
MOSLEY, L. (2007). “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing 
to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor 
Rights”. Comparative Political Studies, 40, pp. 923-948.
STIGLITZ, Joseph E. (2002). Globalization and Its 
Discontents. W.W. Norton & Co.
  
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNC)
 MNC = TNCs = MNEs
–MNC: “a firm that controls and manages production 
establishments –plants– in at least two countries.”
– MNC place multiple production facilities in multiple 
countries under the control of a single corporate structure.
MNC activities
Production
International trade
Cross-border investment
  
IMPORTANCE OF MNC
– 70-80 million workers around the world.
– Number: 1969: 7.300  1988: 18.500  2008: + 82.000.→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000. → 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
– 100 biggest MNC: 25% world trade; 5% world GDP.
– 100 largest economic entities: 31 states, 69 MNC.
– Vast majority of MNC from core and advanced countries 
(US, EU, Japan, China, SE Asia). The same with FDI 
outflows and inflows.
  
  
  
  
  
  
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS
FDI outward flows, 1970-2015 (UNCTAD, 2016)
 FDI: when a firm based in one 
country builds a new plant or a 
factory (greenfield), or purchases an 
existing one, in a second country.
  
WHY INTERNATIONALIZATION?
Reasons for internationalization: locational 
advantages in foreign countries.
—Large reserve of natural resources.
— Large local market (demand and competition, 
jump over tariffs and NTBs).
— Opportunities to enhance efficiency by 
reducing costs (lower wages or prices of means of 
production).
  
WHY INTERNALIZATION?
—  1/3 of world trade takes place within companies 
(internalized, out of the market).
Reasons for internalization: market imperfections.
— Horizontal integration: the same good in different 
locations (intangible assets, fundamental paradox of 
information).
— Vertical integration: intermediate goods in different 
locations (specific assets, particular long-term 
economic relationship, opportunistic behavior).
  
WHEN MNC?
 Internationalization + Internalization  MNC.→ MNC.
—Locational advantages  cross-border activity → 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
will be profitable.
—Market imperfections  a firm can take → 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
advantage of these profitable opportunities only by 
internalizing the transactions within a single 
corporate structure.
  
BENEFITS FOR HOST COUNTRIES
Benefits  MNC bring to host countries:→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
— Foreign savings on a stable basis.
— Technology and managerial expertise (positive 
externalities).
— Access to global marketing chains.
  
HARMS FOR HOST COUNTRIES
Harms  MNC extract from host countries:→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
— Local savings by borrowing (crowding-out) and repatriation of 
profits and rents.
— Royalties and licence fees for technology imported.
— Transfer pricing by subsidiaries supplies.
— Destruction of local industries (and their local suppliers) by 
unfair competition.
— Neither technology nor expertise transfer  enclaves.→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
— Against industrial policy  surrender of economic sovereignty.→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
“MNC are profit-making enterprises, and their activities are 
oriented toward that end and no toward raising the welfare of 
their host countries.”
  
REGULATING MNC IN THE PERIPHERY COUNTRIES
— From colonialism to economic dominance by MNC.
— By prohibitions and requirements. Generally, regulating 
MNC rather than prohibiting FDI.
– Nationalization of key sectors: natural resources, public 
utilities, banking, insurance…
– Compulsory partnership with local companies, limits to 
repatriation of profits and rents.
– Performance requirements (supplies, financing, 
employment).
— More open in South Asia (EPZs) than in Latin America or 
Africa.
— Generalized liberalization from the 1980s.
  
REGULATING MNC IN THE CORE COUNTRIES
— More open to FDI and less regulations on MNC.
— Just a few prohibitions related to foreign ownership 
of key industries.
—Japanese exception until the 1970s in order to foster 
industrial policy by technology transfers.
— SWFs (Sovereign Wealth Funds) threat: Norway, 
China, UAE, Saudi Arabia…  around $20 trillion.→ 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000.
  
WHY SUCH DIFFERENCES?
— More powerful and diversified economies in core 
countries, with more competitive and developed industries.
— Foreign investors more likely to be open to FDI in order to 
avoid retaliation.
— Ideological and political differences regarding govt 
participation in economy.
  
BARGANING BETWEEN HOST COUNTRIES AND MNC
— Bargaining power as function of monopolistic control.
– Natural resources: MNC < countries (due to obsolescing 
bargain).
– Cheap labor force (manufactures): MCN > countries 
(locational incentives, social-labor dumping or “race to 
the bottom”).
  
INTERNATIONAL RULES ON MNC
— No comprehensive regulations due to irreconcilable conflict 
between capital-exporters and capital-importers.
— Just some lesser rules within WTO, OECD and some RTAs.
— Basic rules (USSR as the greatest challenge):
– FDI are private property to be treated as domestic 
property.
– Govts can expropriate foreign capital only for public 
purposes.
– Expropriation with fair compensation (no confiscation).
– Foreign investors can appeal to their home countries in the 
case of a dispute  → 1988: 18.500 → 2008: + 82.000. Calvo Doctrine as a historical 
exception.
  
INTERNATIONAL RULES ON MNC
Main achievements and failures: 
—ITO’s failure due to FDI treatment rejected by the US. No 
rules on FDI in GATT.
— UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over National 
Resources (1962) as an achievement for host countries.
— TRIM (Trade Related Investment Measures) within 
WTO’s Uruguay Round. Quite restricted.
— MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) within the 
OECD. Only developed countries. Never signed.
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WTO (2011). World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and 
Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to 
Coherence  → pp. 46-54 + 85-86 (“Conclusions”) + 94-98.
RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Krueger, A. (1999). “Are Preferential Trading Agreements Trade-
Liberalizing or Protectionist?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (4).
Baldwin, R. (2006). “Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as 
Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade”. NBER Working Paper 
Series, 12545.
Panagariya, A. (2002). “EU Preferential Trade Arrangements and 
Developing Countries”. The World Economy: 1415-1432.
  
PREFERENTIAL-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (PTA-RTA)
 PTA: Preferential Trade Agreements.
 RTA: Regional Trade Agreements.
Basic kinds 
of PTA
Free trade agreements (FTA) (no internal 
tariffs + individual external tariffs)
Custom unions (CU) (no internal tariffs + 
common external tariff)
  
PTA EVOLUTION AND IMPORTANCE
– Around 300 PTA currently (an average of 13 PTA for 
each WTO member).
– 50% of international trade under PTA  just about 16% → 
potentially preferential; just 2% eligible for preference 
margins under above 10% (30% and 4% including EU).
– So, 84% of international trade under MFN rules (70% 
including EU).
– PTA tariffs < MFN tariffs (preference margin) ≈ 1% (2% 
including EU).
– PTA NTB << MFN NTB (services trade, foreign 
investment, intellectual property, govt procurement). 
Rules of origin (RoOs) and other administrative rules.
  
PTA HISTORY: UNTIL THE 19th CENTURY
– Empires: secure access for foreign markets, protection 
for national merchants abroad.
– GB industrial revolution  abolition of protection → 
(Eden Treaty, 1786; Corn Laws, 1846; Navigation Acts, 
1849; Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, 1860).
– Crisis of 1873 + Germany and Italy unification + US as 
a free rider + overseas colonies expansion  slower → 
pace in liberalization trends.
  
PTA HISTORY: 1900 – 1950s
– Tentative progress after WW1 until the Great 
Depression  beggar-thy-neighbour policies and world → 
trade collapse. Defensive (GB Imperial Preferences) 
and hostile trade blocs (Germany, Japan).
– US: from protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act (1934) 
to liberal Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (1934).
– Unborn ITO, more modest GATT (1947). Principles 
based on US RTAA basic lines.
  
PTA HISTORY: 1950s – TODAY
– 3 waves of regionalism after the GATT (“domino 
effect” between regionalism and multilateralism):
– 50-60s: ECSC (1951), EEC (1957), EFTA (1957).
– 80-90s: EC common market (Maastricht, 1993), 
enlargement to the East after USSR fall; projects in Latin 
America (MERCOSUR, 1991), Africa (COMESA, EAC, 
UEMOA, SADC) and South East Asia (ASEAN, APEC). 
GATT  WTO (1995).→ 
– Since 2000: EU-EEUU (TTIP, TiSA, CETA) and South 
Asian countries + WTO decline (Doha Round failure).
  
CLASIFICATION OF PTA
– Criteria:
– Level of development (developed-developed, developing-
developed, developing-developing).
– Geographical coverage (intra-regional, cross-regional).
– Type of PTA (bilateral, multilateral, among PTAs).
– Degree of integration (FTA, CU).
– Issue of coverage (goods, services, investments...)
  
  
  
  
MOTIVES FOR PTA
–Neutralizing “beggar-thy-neighbour” trade policies.
– Gaining credibility (predictability).
– Other economic motives: increase market size, attract FDI.
– Political motives: regional political integration, mutual 
political confidence, political hegemony building, increase 
bargaining power within multilateral negotiations.
“Domino effect”
Regionalism/Bilateralism -vs- Multilateralism: 
complementary rather than rivals.
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Florida, R. “The World is Spiky: Globalization has changed the 
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International Forum on Globalization. “A Better World is 
Possible!” (11 pp).
Rodrik, D. “Has Globalization Gone too Far?” (7 pp).
Sen, A. “How to Judge Globalism” (6 pp).
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RECOMMENDED READINGS:
Rodrik, D. (2010). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World 
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Friedman, T.L. (1999). The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.
  
CONSEQUENCES
Has the world become flat (level playing field)? (Friedman). 
No, it hasn’t (Stiglitz).
1) Promotion of hyper-growth as an end in itself.
2) Conversion of national economies to export-oriented 
models.
3) Tariffs, NTBs and export subsidies within core countries 
increasingly harmful for periphery countries.
4) Deregulated movement of capital  financialization and → financialization and 
recurring financial and monetary crisis (external debt in 
Latin America: 1980s; EMS –£, lira, pta, escudo–: 1992-93; 
Mexico: 1994; South East Asia: 1997; Russia: 1998; Turkey: 
2001; Argentina: 2001-02; Iceland: 2009; EMU: 2010…)
  
CONSEQUENCES
5) External debt in periphery countries. 
6) Dramatically increased corporate concentration.
7) Privatization, commodification of public services and 
commons.
8) Undermining of national social, health, environmental 
policies.
9) Permanent attack over wages, labor conditions and unions 
(permanent structural adjustment).
10) Growing inequality between and within countries.
  
CONSEQUENCES
11) Overexploitation of resources and destruction of 
environment (climate change, global warming, 
greenhouse effect...).
12)  Intensive consumerism.
13) Erosion of traditional and local values and social 
norms.
14) Cultural homogenization (Westernisation) and 
monopolization of knowledge. 
15) Feminization of poverty.
  
CONFLICTS
– Capital against labor (including workers and pensioners) 
and environmentalists. States in between?
– Conflicts and tensions:
– Asymmetry between those who can cross national borders 
(capital, high-skilled workers and managers) and those 
who cannot (labor). Increasing substitutability of the 
latter. Consequences: less bargaining power, lower wages, 
less stability, worse labor conditions.
– Erosion of domestic and traditional social norms and 
labor rights. Cultural and social homogeneity.
– Increasing difficulty for governments to provide social 
insurance against external risks caused by globalization.
  
STRATEGY
– Permanent structural adjustment: IMF, WTO, WB, EU, ECB…
– Standard package:
– Cut government spending on public services in favour of 
paying foreign debt.
– Devalue national currency and increase exports, reducing real 
wages, and subsidizing export-oriented foreign investments.
– Liberalize financial markets to attract speculative short-term 
portfolio investments  financial instability.→ financialization and 
– Increase interest rates to attract foreign speculative capital, 
increasing domestic finance costs.
– Eliminate tariffs and NTBs, increasing imports of consumer 
goods purchased with borrowed foreign money.
– It helps to lower inflation, but it does not work to promote 
growth, employment or equality (case of Argentina).
  
ALTERNATIVES
– Antiglobalization critics: with or without alternative projects? 
–World Social Forum -vs- World Economic Forum.
– Basic foundations for another world:
–Democracy: political, social and economic.
–Local subsidiarity.
–Ecological sustainability.
–Common heritage’s protection: natural resources, culture and 
basic public services.
–Human rights.
–Working class rights.
–Food security and food safety.
–Equity-equality + diversity.
–Precautionary principle.
  
WHAT’S THE REAL PROBLEM?
– Has economic globalization outpaced political and 
social globalization? 
– Financialization, financial crisis, speculation?
– Triumphant Neoliberalism after the fall of 
Communism?
– Capitalism?
